Existence and Policy Effectiveness in Feedback Nash LQ-Games

Nicola Acocella, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo


This paper illustrates how the classical theory of economic policy can profitably be used to verify some properties of the Linear Nash Feedback Equilibrium in difference LQ-games. In particular, we find that both a necessary condition for the equilibrium existence and a sufficient condition for policy ineffectiveness can be defined in the terms of the simple Tinbergen counting rule.


LQ-policy games, policy ineffectiveness, controllability, Linear Feedback Nash Equilibrium existence.

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